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Abstract 
 
Academics and business practitioners have extensively debated the dramatic increase 
in institutional ownership and the sudden interest of institutional shareholders in 
corporate governance. This paper examined the relationship that exists between 
institutional shareholder engagement and financial performance of selected listed firms 
in Nigeria. This study used primary data to describe the independent variables: namely 
institutional ownership, exercise of voting rights and private negotiation. It also used 
panel data for twenty (20) selected listed firms for the period 2011-2013. Firm’s 
performance was measured using Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and 
Tobin’s Q. Findings indicate that there is no significant relationship between institutional 
shareholder engagement and firms’ financial performance in Nigeria. However, the 
results were mixed when the performance indicators in term of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s 
Q. This research study suggests that institutional shareholders in Nigeria should 
become efficient monitors of corporate management just like what obtains in developed 
countries. This will ensure effective and good corporate governance practices and avoid 
insider abuse for the enhancement of financial performance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been generally argues that institutional shareholders are vital corporate 
governance mechanisms that enhance the performance of the firm because of their 
ability to monitor and influence corporate decisions. In recent times, a high percentage 
of worldwide assets are under the operative control of institutional shareholders [1]. 
Institutional shareholders are growing increasingly active because they believe that 
better corporate governance will bring them higher rewards [2]. 
 
Throughout the twentieth century, the structure of ownership continued to change and in 
various countries presently, individual share ownership has deteriorated and institutional 
share ownership has increased [3]. In the United Kingdom, institutional ownership was 
about 60 percent to 70 percent of companies listed in the United Kingdom Stock 
Exchange between 1990 and 1995 [4]. Gompers [5] established that, in the United 
States, institutional ownership increased from approximately 50 percent to 80 percent 
between the year 1996 and 2000 [4]. In 1980s and 1990s, the proportion of equities 
held by institutional shareholders was on the increase (Yong, 2013). According to 
OECD [1], institutional shareholders held financial assets in excess of $53 trillion with 
some $22 trillion in equities.  
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The available statistics for Nigeria indicate that there has been increased institutional 
ownership especially foreign investment. The total foreign portfolio investment in 2010 
was USD 2.7 billion representing an increase of 48 percent total turnover value over 
2009 [6]. The increase in institutional shareholdings has made many predict the end of 
the separation of ownership and control [7]. With increased investment by institutional 
shareholders, then the issue of institutional shareholder engagement and the impact on 
financial performance cannot be overlooked. 
 
Yakasai [8] argued that institutional shareholders play a very vital role in calling 
management to account in Nigeria. Uche [6] that institutional shareholders in Nigeria 
can enhance good corporate governance and better information dissemination between 
management and shareholders supported this. However, in Nigeria, shareholder 
activism is seeing as tool for populist rabble-rousing and an interruption to the 
organization of annual general meetings [9]. According to Okike [10] shareholders’ 
associations in Nigeria in contrast with institutional shareholders can be seen as the 
major group of players that are involved in governance activism [6]. Adeyemi [9] claims 
that there is need for institutional shareholders to become more engaged in company’s 
general meetings. 
 
The recent surge in the demand for institutional shareholding is necessitate going by the 
recent corporate scandals all over the world and especially in Nigeria where 
shareholders and other stakeholders’ interests have been eroded [11]. According to Del 
Guercio & Hawkins, corporate scandals and abuse of power by executives can be 
seeing as major hindrances to the maximization of wealth of institutional shareholders. 
As a result, efforts are made by institutional shareholders to influence company 
practices and even more the use of a firm approach to effect changes [6].  
 
As a result, the corporate governance debate has produced a range of suggestions as 
to how institutional shareholders might become more active in term of monitoring and 
engaging the managers of funds especially in Nigeria. However, the effectiveness or the 
impact this debate has on return on investment (for stakeholders in Nigeria) remains 
unclear.  
 
Institutional shareholders as monitors of management have gain significant attentions 
recently [2]. There have been various studies for example in the United States to 
determine whether institutional shareholders have a significant influence on corporate 
performance. The results are mix [7]. In Nigeria, there is lack of prior studies that 
examine the relationship between institutional shareholder engagement and firms’ 
financial performance. While literatures have examined the potential link between 
shareholder activism in Nigeria, which usually takes place during the Annual General 
Meeting (hereinafter referred to as AGM) and the political culture of the country [12]. 
None to the best of our knowledge has considered the actual engagements/involvement 
of shareholders’ in term of private negotiations with managements who makes decisions 
daily that could affect the shareholders’ wealth either positively or negatively. 
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In addition, this study also considers the voting right of the shareholders’ and how it 
could be used to influence management decision making. Therefore, this study 
examines the effect of institutional shareholder engagement on firms’ financial 
performance among the listed firms in Nigeria to determine the level of engagement that 
can be recognize as significant to the enhancement of firms’ financial performance to 
avoid any form of conflicts of interest that may arise between the agent (directors) and 
the principal (shareholders). 
 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Institutional shareholders have been proclaim as the saviours of shareholder rights due 
to their size combination, focused share ownership, pleasing reputation and their right to 
a wide range of financial resources, which enables them to conquer the lack of interest 
shown by shareholders [4]. According to Wong, while bankers and brokers prevail as 
the main culprits for causing major financial crisis, a less expected suspect is gradually 
coming under examination. Politicians and regulators as also causing the crisis due to 
their passive engagement in corporate governance and a concentration on short-term 
returns have accused the institutional shareholders, who have been recognized as the 
suspects. It can therefore be seeing that the prominent increase of corporate 
governance failures has only added to the rising expectation for institutional 
shareholders to become more functioning in the corporate governance of firms in which 
they invest [4]. However, the influence of institutional shareholders in corporate 
governance of firms is debatable; some are of the opinion that their influence in 
corporate governance advances the firm. 
 
However, in Nigeria, institutional shareholders consider engagement and monitoring as 
time absorbing. In fact monitoring is view by institutional shareholders in Nigeria as an 
act of uncontrolled and disobedient behaviour [6,12]. Therefore, an in-depth study into 
connecting governance to performance is needed, as this will encourage institutional 
shareholders to rise up in their involvement in corporate governance [4]. 
 
Corporate Governance and the rising of Shareholders’ Engagement in 
Nigeria 
 
Schloetzer posited that, there is a clear and rising shareholder engagement in Nigeria. 
However, not up until the economic improvement agenda undertaken by the Nigerian 
government in 2004, which resulted in the resurrection of the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE), Nigerian companies ordinarily never saw the stock exchange as a medium for 
raising new capital. This continually hindered the ability of the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
to function as a market for directing companies [6]. As a result, in 2004 and 2006, when 
Nigerian banks were to recapitalize there was a surge in the capital market where banks 
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had gone to raise capital and declaring huge profits in billions to shareholders. 
 
This development resulted in increase in foreign investment portfolios and the local 
investment in the Nigerian Capital Market. The capital market has experience 
tremendous growth in recently which necessitated stringent policies and control to 
ensure that shareholders funds are protected. This development resulted in 
shareholder’s activism (i.e. where small shareholders with diverse percentage of shares 
in various firms in which a combination of members’ shares leads to substantial 
percentage of votes at AGM. This however has not yielded enough results as this 
association with laden with corruptions and compromises. However, as the market 
continues to expand and accommodate foreign and institutional investors and the need 
to protect the market from shenanigans that almost collapse the market in Nigeria 
recently, there is a rising spate of shareholders’ engagement, which is primarily to 
promote sound corporate governance, reduce cost of governance and promoting 
shareholders’ wealth. 
 
Shareholder Activism in Nigeria and the need for Institutional 
Shareholders 
 
While shareholder activism in Nigeria is still in its premature developmental phase, there 
is an already rapidly growing institutional misapprehension and misapplication of the 
concept [12]. This is the reason why in Nigeria shareholder activism is seeing as tool for 
populist rabble-rousing and an interruption to the organization of AGM. It is considers an 
extortion scheme [13]. According to Okara, it has been observes that shareholder 
associations sometimes give a show of their power to thwart legal operations and the 
smooth running of the company. Adegbite [12] make it clear that their survey outcome 
truly demonstrate that activist shareholders are gradually seeing as pests or rascals to 
normality in corporate organization and management and that the ways in which 
shareholders’ associations execute their activisms mirror level of oppression and 
corruption intrinsic in the Nigerian political culture. Iyaniwura [14] contend that 
conceivably the exploit of shareholders’ association is produced out of frustration and a 
means of call for help, nevertheless to whom.  
 
In Nigeria, it was observed that shareholders’ association has taken the over the 
responsibility of institutional shareholders. However, the former is becoming quite 
ineffective in ensuring good corporate governance because of corruption and sell-outs. 
In fact, there is a scenario where onetime shareholders’ association’s president was 
made a director of a firm as its reward for compromise [12]. Therefore, there is an 
urgent need for institutional shareholders to take up their responsibility for ensuring 
good management of funds and sound corporate governance in a firm. 
  
Institutional Shareholders’ Views on Engagement in Nigeria 
 
It has been made known that shareholders in Nigeria are majorly faced with the problem 
of lack of knowledge and even in situations where they do know their rights, there is a 
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passive nature of lack of experience as to the best method possible in the situations 
[14]. In a particular interview with institutional shareholders in Nigeria, Uche & Adegbite 
[6] were able to discover institutional shareholders’ views on engagement and activism. 
It can be seeing from the interview that institutional shareholders have a passive 
approach to engagement.  
 
In Nigeria; when institutional investors perceive that a company was not doing great, 
they would immediately sell off their shares. According to them, selling off their shares is 
the best way to maximizing their wealth instead of being involved in activism to enhance 
good governance [6]. Customarily, institutional shareholders are not absolutely engaged 
in corporate governance, they simply maintain the exit policy. It is their belief that, their 
involvement in shareholders’ activism is a way of showing rebellion to the management, 
which could result into threats to their business concerns. In fact, it could also result in 
low patronage of their products, which could also affect their image and brand. Many of 
the institutional shareholders in Nigeria considered monitoring as time and financial 
wastage, which could hinder the maximization of shareholders’ wealth.  
 
Instead of just exiting the firm when there is problem of mismanagement, they should 
rather see the benefits their engagement could bring to their shareholders’ funds and 
the overall benefit to the other smaller unit’s holders and the country at large. This 
would help in mitigating cost of liquidation, increase return on investment, increase firm 
value, ensuring fair representation of all stakeholders) which would eventually lead to 
effective control of resources. 
 
UNDERLYING THEORY 
 
The overarching underlying this study are the stewardship and principal-principal 
agency theory. 
 
Agency Theory: Agency theory explains a situation where families especially in the 
emerging economies are the majority shareholders who are involved in the control of 
the firm. These family owners have rights to the information of the company and are 
self-accountable. Therefore, in this situation, the principal and agent role is bound in 
one body due to the shareholding and their function respectively. Institutional 
shareholders are not exempted from this type of role also as they have meet their 
fiduciary duties to their clients or ultimate shareholders and yet safeguard their 
investments.  Institutional shareholders as principals have a fiduciary responsibility to 
oversee the agents. As agents are, expect to function in the best interest of their clients.  
According to Kostyuk, there is yet another layer of agency problem and another chance 
for supervision when dealing with institutional shareholders. The additional layer of 
agency problem raises the question of who monitors the monitor. Berle conveyed their 
concern about the growing distance that exists between the many individuals who are 
regarded as the ultimate owners of the shares, the investee firms and managers of 
firms. However, there is the assumption that those who manage institutional investing 
organizations may have better motives than management as they should be sternly 
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interested in beneficial investment yield, for this propels most of their wages and 
reputation.  
 
Principal problem exists in the situation where the institutional shareholders wish for 
their institutions to be viewed as profitable and are less bothered about monitoring the 
agents (Hansen & Hill nd). Here, the principal is not interested about the concerns of the 
agent which is long term existence of the firm but strenuously chases after self-interest 
through sell-off therefore engaging in investor exploitation. 
 
Stewardship theory: Stewardship is not about claiming control over the board of 
directors and management. Stewardship functions deal with monitoring and engaging 
with firms on subjects like corporate governance, strategy, risk, capital structure and 
performance [2]. According to Iyaniwura &Iyaniwura [14], there exists a stewardship 
relationship between the shareholders and the board of directors. This relationship is 
however base on directors’ accountability on their performance, the behavior generally 
in the firm and the use of the assets and resources of the firm.  
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Institutional Ownership, Corporate Governance and Firms’ Financial 
Performance: Institutional ownership can be seeing as an investment from a body of 
external investors or investment from a particular institution [13]. Institutional ownership 
is measured through the proportion of shareholding held to the total number of shares 
[15]. A substantial body of research has concentrated on the part institutional 
shareholders have to play in corporate monitoring. The logic is that, because of the high 
cost associated with monitoring, only large shareholders like the institutional 
shareholders can achieve adequate benefits to have an inducement to monitor [16]. A 
large number of studies propose that institutional shareholders actually play a positive 
role in corporate governance [17]. McConnell [18] claim that positive relationship 
between institutional shareholding and firms’ performance is an indicator that the 
institutional shareholders are actually assuming the role of efficient monitoring [19]. 
Mizuno [2] pointed out that more than eighty (80) per cent of registered institutional 
shareholders claim that they would pay more to obtain the shares of a properly 
governed firm than those that are weakly governed. It is therefore evident that there is a 
significant positive relationship between a properly governed firm and institutional 
shareholder attitude. In Mashayekhi [20], it was proposed that corporate checking by 
institutional shareholders can pressure manager behaviour. However, Mizuno [2] 
posited that there has been no robust evidence of correlation between share ownership 
of institutional shareholders and firms’ financial performance.  
 
Exercise of Voting Rights, Corporate Governance and Firms’ Financial 
Performance: Park [1] maintained that, the importance and positive institutional 
shareholders have recognized effect of exercising voting rights (i.e. National Pension 
Fund (NPF) and this has greatly influenced their actions. The supporters of enforced 
voting rule claim that lack of voting is equal to lack of concern and lack of participation in 
JIBC April 2016, Vol. 21, No.2 - 8 -  
 
 
corporate governance. However, the empirical indication demonstrates that this is not 
the situation [21]. In fact, it is generally believes and has been proven that most matters 
are settled behind the scenes. According to [1], voting is one of the core engagement 
mechanisms open to shareholders; however, their report proposes that there are 
numerous reasons why it should not be regarded as the core measure of quality of 
dialogue between firms and shareholders: Firstly, as institutional share ownership has 
developed, direct engagement between large shareholders and boards has also 
improved. These private methods of engagement modify the types of proposals even 
presented at meetings and turn the voting results into a rather restricted sample. So, 
even after institutional shareholders engaged management in term of voting right and 
other forms of activisms which is aimed at leading to higher stock price and higher 
dividend, the questions is does the involvement actually resulted in the price increase. 
 
Private Negotiation, Corporate Governance and Firms’ Financial Performance: A 
major reason why extant research does not show the nature of the relationship between 
negotiations by institutional shareholders and firms is that the details of negotiations are 
normally not shared with outsiders [22]. Black [23] submitted that, virtually all research 
studies concentrate on visible activism. Invisible activism, also known as behind-the 
scenes activism also happens in the United States (US); however, by definition, its 
effect is quite hard to study. The findings of Black & Coffee [23] reveal that it is 
completely probable that behind the scene activism is more operational than visible 
activism as United Kingdom (UK) firms have emphasized that their most effective 
interventions have happened far from the public limelight. Ramsay [7] also in their study 
of institutional investors’ views on corporate governance in Australia find out that ten 
institutions out of twelve institutions that is examined do not agree with voting against 
management. They actually claim that quarrelsome matters is settled behind the scenes 
and not by voting against management as voting can be considered unnecessary due to 
any simple mistake. According to Financial Times as cited in Stapledon [21], the 
removal of Mirror Group Chief Executive Officer in the year 1999, actually involved 
behind-the-scenes petitioning and gatherings.  
 
Based on the fore-going discussions, the following hypotheses are formulated for this 
study. 
 
H1: There is no significant relationship between Institutional ownership and firms’ 
financial performance in Nigeria. 
H2: There is no significant relationship between the exercise of voting rights and firms’ 
financial performance in Nigeria. 
H3: There is no significant relationship between private negotiations and firms’ financial 
performance in Nigeria. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
The major purpose of this project is to examine the effects of institutional shareholder 
engagement on firm's financial performance in Nigeria and the focus is the listed firms. 
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Therefore, the population of this study is 195 listed firms in Nigeria (The Nigerian 
Investor, 2014). The sectors include agriculture (7), airlines (3), automobiles (6), 
banking (21), breweries (6), building materials (9), chemical & paints (7), commercial 
service (10), conglomerates (9), construction (6), engineering technology (4), food, 
beverages and tobacco (15), footwear (1), healthcare (11), hotel & tourism (2), industrial 
& domestic products (10), insurance (23), leasing (1), machinery (3), managed funds 
(2), maritime (4), other financial institutions (2), packaging (10), petroleum(8), printing & 
publishing (4), real estate (1), real estate investment trust (3), telecommunication (1), 
textiles (6).  
 
The sample size used for this research was 20 selected listed firms in Nigeria (Table 1). 
This was obtained by adopting John Curry rule of thumb, which is presented in the table 
below [24]: 
 
Table 1: Adopting John Curry rule of thumb. 
 
Population size Sampling Per cent 
0-100 100% 
101-1,000 10% 
1,001-5,000 5% 
5,001-10,000 3% 
10,000+ 1% 
Source Yount [24] 
 
 
The data was collected from the annual report of firms and the primary data was 
sourced by the administration of set of questionnaires. 
 
Model specification 
 
In order to examine the relationship between institutional shareholder engagement and 
financial performance of firms, a linear regression model equation was used. The two 
constructs involved include institutional shareholder engagement and financial 
performance. 
 
The regression equation can be computed as: 
Y = β0 + βX1 + µit………………………………………………………………...... 
..................…                                                                                                                 (1) 
The above can be deducted to; 
ROE1-t = IO1-t + VR1-t + PN1-t…………………………………………………m             (2)                             
ROA1-t = IO1-t + VR1-t + PN1-t …………………………………………………………… (3)  
Q1-t = IO1-t + VR1-t + PN1-t ………………………………………………………………  (4)  
Therefore, the equation is: 
ROE1-t = β0 + β1IO1-t +β2VR1-t +β3 PN1-t + µ1-t………………                                                             
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(5) 
ROA1-t = β0 + β1IO1-t +β2VR1-t +β3 PN1-t + µ1-
t……………………………………...........……..                                                          (6) 
Q1-t = β0 + β1IO1-t +β2VR1-t +β3 PN1-t + µ1-
t……………………………………...............…..…                                                     (7) 
Where, 
 
ROE = Return on equity (Annual net income/Average stockholders’ equity) 
ROA = Return on asset (Annual net income/Average total assets) 
Q = Tobin’s Q (Total market value/Total asset value) 
IO = Institutional ownership 
VR = Exercise of voting rights 
PN = Private negotiations  
β = Coefficient of parameters 
µ = Error term, which captures other explanatory variables not explicitly included in the 
model. 
1-t = time coefficient 
 
ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
 
This section focuses on the presentation, analysis of the secondary data and results 
obtained from the annual reports of selected listed firms in Nigeria (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of sampled firms. 
 
 ROA IO VR PN ROE Q 
Mean 0.286624
8 
0.5545833 0.5795 0. 
4286667 
0.1011812 0.2229635 
Maximum 15.77285 0.9 0.9 0.9 9.054231 5.746339 
Minimum -
1.014167 
0.145 0.145 0.145 -9.813666 0.0036627 
Std. dev. 2.039394 0.2888424 0.2401601 0. 
2588139 
1.748713 0.7396349 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Field Survey (2015) 
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Table 2 shows a summary of the descriptive statistics of all the variables for the sample 
of all the sectors ranging from 2011-2013. It shows the mean, the standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum points. Based on the results above, average ROA for the 
sample stood at 0.2866248 with a standard deviation of 2.039394. It also reveals that 
the minimum ROA on average is -1.014167 and the maximum point is 15.77285.  
   
The statistics on IO shows an average mean of 0.5545833 and standard deviation of 
0.2888424. It also shows a minimum of 0.145 and a maximum of 0.9. This shows that 
the average mean of Institution Ownership is high. According to Adeyemi [13], the 
proportion of ownership from institution is usually greater than individual investor 
because it is presumed that institutional shareholders have greater impact than other 
individual shareholder. Although the proportion of 55.45% is not very high, it is however 
above average. This result shows that about 44.55% of ownership in the selected listed 
firms from 2011-2013 cannot be traced to institutional shareholders.  
 
The statistics on VR shows an average mean of 0.5795 and standard deviation of 
0.2888424. It also shows a minimum of 0.145 and a maximum of 0.9. This result shows 
that the proportion of the exercise of voting rights by institutional shareholders in all the 
firms used for this research study ranging from 2011-2013 is high. The high proportion 
is due to the fact that the process of voting is seen as the simplest form of engagement 
in corporate governance [7]. Also many institutional shareholders engage with their 
portfolio firms through proxy voting which makes it easier [25]. Although this proportion 
of 57.95% is also not very high, it is however above average. This result shows that 
about 42.05% of institutional shareholders do not exercise their voting rights, which to 
an extent is very close to average. According to Park [1], the main reason for the low 
rate of voting right by institutional shareholders is their behaviour in investment. They 
are short-term investors that really do not have so much interest in the improvement of 
corporate governance, as according to Uche [6], institutional shareholders in Nigeria 
consider engagement as time wasting.          
             
The statistics on PN shows an average mean of 0.4286667 and standard deviation of 0. 
2588139. It also shows a minimum of 0.145 and a maximum of 0.9. This shows that the 
average mean of PN is not very high as it is below average; however, it shows that 
institutional shareholders to an extent are involved in behind-the-scenes engagement. 
Shareholders are probably not involved so much in private negotiation like voting rights 
because apart from the reason stated above for the high engagement in voting rights, 
according to Park [1] it is quite difficult to establish the outcome of engagement 
especially through private negotiations, thereby making it hard to measure its 
effectiveness. However, private negotiation seems to be on the increase as Stapledon 
[21] reveal that it is completely probable that behind the scene, activism is more 
operational than visible activism. 
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Multicollinearity Test (Correlation Matrix) 
 
The test for multicollinearity is carried out when trying to establish if there is a perfect 
linear relationship among one or more explanatory variables in a regression analysis.  
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test was carried out to test for the multicollinearity 
and the results are presented in the Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Multicollinearity table. 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
IO 2.42 0.413460 
VR 2.25 0.445109 
PN 1.21 0.828594 
MEAN VIF 1.96  
Field survey (2015)  
 
The rule of thumb for multicollinearity when making use of the VIF test is that when VIF 
< 5 or when the 1/VIF > 0.1, there is no multicollinearity. Therefore, from the above 
table, there is no multicollinearity among the variables and the researcher can therefore 
continue with all the independent variables (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Panel data regression when ROA is the dependent variable. 
 
 Pooled effect Fixed effect 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p- value 
IO 0.8843977 0.531 -0.2100319 0.954 
VR 1.448282 0.377 0.3064677 0.929 
PN -1.990899 0.077 -0.3969036 0.928 
CONSTANT -0.1896947 0.793 0.3956463 0.854 
R-squared 0.0861  0.0281  
Adjusted R-squared 0.0371    
F-statistic 1.76  0.01  
Sig. (F statistic) 0.1656  0.9994  
Source: Field survey  
  
From the results derived from Table 4, the coefficient of Institutional Ownership (IO) and 
Private Negotiations (PN) were negatively signed which indicated an insignificant 
negative relationship between IO, PN and ROA. This showed that a percentage 
increase in IO and PN would result in a decrease in ROA by 0.210% and 0.397 
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respectively. This means that institutional ownership and private negotiation with the 
management have a negative impact on return on assets in Nigeria. Because, 
ordinarily, return on assets deals with the proficiency of management in generating 
returns from its assets, the result therefore shows that the higher the involvement of 
institutional ownership and private negotiations, the lower the efficiency of management 
in generating returns from its assets and on the returns on shareholders’ investment in 
term of their interest in the firm. This result is in line with Mashayekhi [20] and 
Kyereboah [26] who found no positive relationship between institutional ownership, 
ROA. It is therefore concludes that institutional ownership and private negotiation do not 
affect ROA in Nigeria.  0.3064677 
 
However, in terms exercising of voting rights (VR), there was a positive relationship 
between VR and ROA. This shows that a percentage increase in VR would result to an 
increase in ROA by 0.306%, which is to say that institutional ownership had a positive 
impact on firm’s Tobin’s Q as an indicator for performance. Tobin’s Q ratio is a ratio 
relating a firm’s market value to its book value. It could therefore be seeing that 
institutional shareholding serves as a positive indicator to prospective investors, which 
therefore boosts market valuation of firms (Table 5). This position corroborates 
Kyereboah [26] who found a positive relationship between institutional ownership and 
Tobin’s Q. In Nigeria, are seeing as mainly concern about the protection of their 
investment rather than the overall interest of the market.  
 
Table 5: Panel data regression when ROE is the dependent variable. 
  
 Pooled effect Fixed effect 
Variables Coefficient p- value Coefficient p-value 
IO -1.194879 0.338 -1.194879 0.404 
VR 1.969828 0.175 1.969828 0.068 
PN 0.0390699 0.968 0.0390699 0.647 
CONSTANT -0.3944225 0.537 -
0.3944225 
0.615 
R-squared 0.0327  0.0262  
Adjusted R-squared 0.0191    
F-statistic 0.63  1.18  
Sig. (F statistic) 0.5975  0.3315  
Source: Field survey (2015)  
 
From the results derived from Table 5 above, the coefficient of IO was negatively 
signed, which indicated a negative insignificant relationship between IO and ROE. This 
showed that a percentage increase in IO would result in a decrease in ROE by 1.195%, 
which is to say that institutional ownership had a negative effect on return on equity. 
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This result shows that the higher the institutional ownership, the lower the returns 
generated with the money invested by the common stock shareholders. This result is 
also in line with Mashayekhi [20] who found no positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and ROE. 
In addition, in term of VR, the coefficient was positively signed, which indicated a 
positive relationship between VR and ROE. This showed that a percentage increase in 
VR would result to an increase in ROE by 1.970%, which is to say that the exercise of 
voting rights by institutional shareholders had a positive impact on return on assets. 
However, there was no significant relationship between VR and ROE judging from the 
p>|t| value of 0.068 which is significant at less than 5%.  
 
Thus, the following results can be interpreted as: the coefficient of PN was positively 
signed, which indicated a positive relationship between PN and ROE. This showed that 
a percentage increase in PN would result in an increase in ROE by 0.039%, which is to 
say that private negotiations by institutional shareholders had a positive impact on 
return on equity (Table 6). However, there was no significant relationship between PN 
and ROE judging from the p>|t| value of 0.647 which is significant at less than 5%. 
 
Table 6: Panel data regression when Q (Tobin’s Q) is the dependent variable. 
  
 Pooled effect Fixed effect 
Variables Coefficient Significant 
value 
Coefficient Significant 
value 
IO 0.1637642 0.750 0.0336102 0.980 
VR 0.5689906 0.342 -
0.0403487 
0.974 
PN -0.7178569 0.081 0.1548304 0.922 
CONSTA
NT 
0.1101338 0.677 0.1613353 0.837 
R-squared 0.0753  0.0292  
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.73005    
F-statistic 1.52  0.00  
Sig. (F 
statistic) 
0.2194  0.9996  
Source: Field survey (2015)  
 
The results in Table 6 showed that the coefficient of IO was positively signed, which 
indicated a insignificant positive relationship between IO and Q. This means, a 
percentage increase in IO would result to an increase in Q by 0.034%, which is to say 
that institutional ownership had a positive impact on Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q ratio is a ratio 
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relating a firm’s market value to its book value. It can therefore be seeing that 
institutional shareholding serves as a positive indicator to prospective investors, which 
therefore boosts market valuation of firms. This result is in line with Kyereboah [26] who 
found a positive relationship between institutional ownership and Tobin’s Q.  
More so, the coefficient of VR was negatively signed, which indicated a negative 
insignificant relationship between VR and Q. This showed that a percentage increase in 
VR would result in a decrease in Q by 0.040%, which is to say that the exercise of 
voting rights by institutional shareholders had a negative impact on Tobin’s q. According 
to Yong [27], when a firm’s reputation develops, the market appreciates it. This can be 
the reason why there is a decrease in Tobin’s Q as a result of poor corporate 
governance which exists in many developing countries in which Africa is not exclusion.  
In term of Private Negotiation, the coefficient of was positively signed, which indicated a 
positive relationship between PN and Q. This showed that a percentage increase in PN 
would result to an increase in Q by 0.155%, which is to say that private negotiations by 
institutional shareholders had a positive impact on Tobin’s q. However, there was no 
significant relationship between PN and Q judging from the p>|t| value of 0.922 which is 
significant at less than 5%.  
 
Implications and Interpretation of Findings 
 
The result shows that the presence of institutional shareholders is not significant 
enough to change the performance of firms. According to McConnell [18], the significant 
relationship between institutional shareholding and firms’ performance is an indicator 
that the institutional shareholders are actually assuming the role of efficient monitoring 
[19]. As such, the results indicates that institutional shareholders in Nigeria even as 
owners are not assuming the role of efficient monitoring. Iyaniwura [14] claim that 
majority shareholders in Nigeria have little knowledge on their rights and even in 
situations where they do know their rights, they are lacking in experience as to the best 
method possible in the situations. Indeed, according to Uche [6], institutional 
shareholders in Nigeria considered monitoring as time wastage. Hence, the postulation 
that there is a significant relationship between institutional ownership and firms’ financial 
performance cannot hold and therefore set aside.  
 
In term of voting rights, the results show that institutional shareholder engagement 
through the exercise of voting rights is not significant enough to affect the performance 
of firms. This might be traceable to the fact that institutional shareholders do not focus 
adequately on real or long-term performance, which in the end results in suboptimal 
return [28]. Although the institutional shareholders have great influence voting rights, 
their exercise of such rights do not significantly, affect firms’ performance, as 
institutional shareholders are not necessarily the controlling shareholders.  Tan & 
Keeper [4] posited that, though, institutional shareholders hold more shares than the 
individual shareholder, those shares is not large enough to grant them the controlling 
rights or interests. In some cases, institutional shareholders too have other business 
concerns to protect and find it difficult to give up their profit-making avenues for the 
cause of good governance [4]. In corroborating this assertion, Iyaniwura & Iyaniwura 
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[14] also submitted that some shareholders are either ignorant or self-satisfied in 
respect of their rights and responsibilities, hence could not make any significant impact 
in term of financial performance. 
 
Therefore, the assertion that exercise of voting rights by institutional shareholders 
enhances firms’ financial performance is rejected. 
 
In term of private negotiations, institutional shareholders focus on short- term 
performance and might not pressure management toward efficiency in generating 
returns from assets; they will be more particular about maximizing their own wealth. 
This also explains the positive relationship that exists between private negotiations and 
return on equity as this signifies that management gives shareholders more for their 
money. In Nigeria, it has being made known that once it was perceived that the 
company was not doing great, institutional shareholders would immediately sell off their 
shares [6].  
 
The positive relationship that exists between private negotiation by institutional 
shareholders and Tobin’s Q might be to prevent them from losing too much in case the 
firm is not doing too well again. According to Brigham, shareholders can take advantage 
of the enhanced market value by selling their shares to the open market. Nix & Chen 
[29] claimed that the most common strategy for institutional shareholders to exercise 
their institutional power is personal discussion with the management. Even as Black & 
Coffee [23] maintained that behind-the-scenes, activism is more operation than visible 
activism. 
 
To this end, the postulation that there is a significant relationship between private 
negotiations by institutional shareholders and firms’ financial performance cannot be 
established. 
 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Several studies particularly in Anglo-Saxon country are still going on based on the 
subject of institutional shareholder engagement and corporate performance. This study 
examines the relationship that exists between three institutional shareholder 
engagement mechanisms (institutional ownership, exercise of voting rights by 
institutional shareholders, private negotiation by institutional shareholders) and firms’ 
financial performance measures (ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q). 
 
This paper therefore concludes that corporate governance in Africa especially in Nigeria 
is at the developmental phase and the 2008 financial crisis can be seeing as a major 
factor that affected corporations in Nigeria. Institutional shareholders in Nigeria is been 
accused as the cause of financial crisis due to their negligence and short-term focus. 
Shareholder associations whose behaviour now reflects that of the political culture are 
seeing as more active in corporate governance. Therefore, their effect on firm 
performance may continue to suffer setback except a pragmatic approach that redefines 
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the role of institutional shareholding is introduced.  
 
This paper therefore maintains that irrespective of the influence institutional 
shareholders have on financial performance, it cannot be seeing as significant. The 
results of Yong [27] reveal that institutional shareholder engagement and activism 
actually results in a higher firm value, however this is very possible by the 
implementation of transparent and accountable corporate governance. Corporate 
governance in Nigeria is weak due to the insider abuse and conflict of interest that 
exists. The research work shows that overall profitability and shareholders’ value will 
enhanced if institutional shareholders in Nigeria show interest in ensuring good 
corporate governance practices.  
 
More so, institutional shareholders should invest with the goal of working with corporate 
management to improve financial performance. This can be achieved by active and 
genuine involvement in corporate governance practices. The stewardship theory 
explains the engagement as not claiming control over the board of directors and 
management but monitoring and engaging with firms on subjects like corporate 
governance, strategy, risk, capital structure and performance. Institutional shareholders 
should not only engage with a short-term view therefore ignoring the long-term 
performance of firms. In addition, the institutional shareholders in Nigeria should work 
with the independent directors to ensure that they monitor the actions of the executive 
directors and the managers to avoid conflicts of interest. The independent directors 
should ensure that venues for AGM are easily accessible to all stakeholders. Lastly, 
managers should also adequately review the decisions and recommendations made by 
the institutional shareholders especially discussions made through private engagement 
by engaging other committees especially the audit committee. This would ensure that 
institutional shareholders do not make recommendations that tend to harm the firm 
financial performance in the long- run.  
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